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Abstract Adaptationists explain the evolution of religion from the cooperative
effects of religious commitments, but which cooperation problem does religion
evolve to solve? I focus on a class of symmetrical coordination problems for which
there are two pure Nash equilibriums: (1) ALL COOPERATE, which is efﬁcient but
relies on full cooperation; (2) ALL DEFECT, which is inefﬁcient but pays
regardless of what others choose. Formal and experimental studies reveal that for
such risky coordination problems, only the defection equilibrium is evolutionarily
stable. The following makes sense of otherwise puzzling properties of religious
cognition and cultures as features of cooperative designs that evolve to stabilise
such risky exchange. The model is interesting because it explains lingering puzzles
in the data on religion, and better integrates evolutionary theories of religion with
recent, well-motivated models of cooperative niche construction.
Keywords Cooperation   Culture   Evolution   Niche construction   Religion   Stag
hunt
Introduction
On September 3rd 1967, Sweden became the ﬁnal country in continental Europe to
make the change from left to right-handed driving.‘‘Ho ¨gertraﬁkomla ˚ggningen’’ or
‘‘The Right-hand Trafﬁc Diversion’’ was widely unpopular. Referendums were
hotly debated among Swedish politicians, and most Swedes resisted the change.
Counting in favour of the switch were the economic advantages of harmonising road
conventions with Sweden’s neighbours and a mounting death toll from confused
foreign motorists. To promote general knowledge of ‘‘Dagen-H’’ (H-Day), the
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scantily clad women, and a song contest for which the winner was ‘‘Ha ˚ll dig till
ho ¨ger, Svensson’’ or ‘‘Keep to the right, Svensson.’’ Even bespoke underwear
displaying the Dagen-H emblem—an automobile smoothly transitioning from left to
right—was marketed to the public. By the morning of Dagen-H, the Swedish
government had spent millions of kronor on the campaign. For all the hype and
worry, however, Dagen-H transpired without accident. September 1967 saw an
overall decline in Swedish road deaths.
1 Dagen-H, and the broader trend to
conformity to which it belongs, illustrates several important, general, and I think
underrated points about the mechanisms that evolve to assure large-scale
cooperation among strangers.
2
Part 1 explains why risky coordination problems present a pervasive challenge to
the evolution of cooperation.
Part 2 describes an evolutionary model for religion called charismatic niche
construction, which shows how religion may evolve to assure efﬁcient but risky
exchange by modulating social/affective cognition.
Part 3 uses this model to make sense of certain data about religion that remain
puzzling on other evolutionary approaches.
Part 4 uses recent experimental results to explain some of the cultural and
cognitive mechanisms by which religions may assure efﬁcient exchange.
While the main purpose of this article is to improve understanding for evolutionary
religious studies, I also hope that my analysis will contribute to a larger
conversation about the importance of cooperative niche construction to explaining
aspects of the human condition (Sterelny 2011).
Part 1. Why risky coordination problems are interesting
Defection need not be motivated from theft
While evolutionary researchers often assimilate cooperation’s problems to varia-
tions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, it has long been understood that cooperation may
fail without any special risk from theft (Binmore 1998; Calcott 2008; Schelling
1960). Cooperation problems admit of varieties, many of which are better modelled
by a different game. I follow Schelling in thinking that:
[w]e should probably identify as the generic problem [of cooperation], not the
inefﬁcient equilibrium of the prisoner’s dilemma, but all the situations in
which equilibria achieved by unconcerted or undisciplined action are
inefﬁcient—the situations in which everyone could be better off, or some
1 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,941144,00.html.
2 Dagen-H marked the end of a gradual progression toward rightward driving in continental Europe that
appears to have begun with the French Revolution (Young 1998; Kincaid 1986).
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or regulated or centralized decisions (Schelling 1978: location 3110).
I will be interested in coordination problems with risk.
Example: The stag hunt
Mention ‘‘risky coordination problem’’ and economists will respond ‘‘The Stag
Hunt.’’
3 The game imagines that partners are hunters who may choose to hunt stags
or to hunt hares. Stag and hare hunting are imagined to be mutually exclusive
strategies. Each hunter does best when all collectively hunt stags, for stags are
invariably captured when all chase stags, but never otherwise.
4 To hunt a stag is to
cooperate. A hunter may also choose to hunt hares. The hare beneﬁt pays less than
the successful stag beneﬁt, though it pays independently of what other partners
choose. To hunt a hare is to defect. When cooperation fails, Betty’s decision to hunt
stags wears the opportunity costs of a lost hare. When cooperation would have
succeeded had Betty cooperated, Betty wears the opportunity costs of a lost stag
portion (Fig. 1).
Here, only the risk dominant equilibrium is evolutionarily stable.
There are two equilibriums for this game: (1) ALL COOPERATE, the Pareto
optimal equilibrium; (2) ALL DEFECT, the risk dominant equilibrium. If ALL
COOPERATE no one can be made better off than by cooperating.
5 If at least one
partner defects, no one can be made better of than by defecting too. Allowing
strategies to evolve, which of these equilibriums is reached depends on the initial
sample of strategies, the number of players, and the differences in the relevant
payoffs (Young 1998). Assuming randomness for an ordinary Stag Hunt, however,
only the risk dominant equilibrium evolves: only defection is stochastically stable
(Young 1993). The reason for this is easy to understand. The advantage of
cooperation is both hard won and fragile: rare defector mutants can destroy
cooperation’s beneﬁt; rare cooperative mutants cannot restore it.
Fig. 1 The stag hunt: payoffs:
HI[LO[0   = equilibrium;
 1 [ 2
3 The Stag Hunt is extensively discussed in Skyrms (2004). The game derives from a passage in
Rousseau’s Discourses (Rousseau 1755), which I discuss below.
4 To allow for both absolute and relative beneﬁts from cooperation it might seem important to add to the
condition that a successful hunt requires the cooperation of ‘‘all but one.’’ Otherwise a lone defector could
gain a relative advantage by spoiling cooperation’s beneﬁt for others. To avoid this problem, I assume
some form of multi-level selection sufﬁcient to favour cooperative over non-cooperative beneﬁts.
5 I ignore the mixed equilibrium because there are no conditions under which it is evolutionarily stable.
Spreading order: religion, cooperative niche construction 3
123Example: The tragedy of the Meadow
Sometimes, what might appear superﬁcially to present a Prisoner’s Dilemma or
Tragedy of the Commons is better construed as a risky coordination dilemma or
Stag Hunt. In David Hume’s parable for collective action:
Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in
common; because it is easy for them to know each others mind; and each must
perceive, that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part is the
abandoning the whole project. But it is very difﬁcult, and indeed impossible,
that a thousand persons should agree in any such action; it being difﬁcult for
them to concert so complicated a design, and still more difﬁcult for them to
execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and
expense, and would lay the whole burden on others (Hume 1739, 3.2.7.).
If we imagine that partners may ‘‘lay the burden to others who will assume it,’’
then the tragedy of the meadow describes a tragedy of the commons. However if we
imagine that the ‘‘trouble and expense’’ of cooperating brings compensating beneﬁts
for which a collective effort is needed, then the tragedy of the meadow is better
formalised as a Stag Hunt (Skyrms 2004). Tragedies of the commons are often
better described as what I will call tragedies of the meadow (see: Ostrom 1990:
chapter 1).
Tragedies of the meadow should not be consigned to the dustbin of irrelevant
formal models. Experimental ﬁndings consistently reveal the fragility of risky
coordination problems (see: Camerer 2003; Van Huyck et al. 1990). Outside the
laboratory, such problems are not always solved, and solutions, where they arise, are
not invincible to evolution’s entropic trend.
6
Why coordination requires assurance mechanisms
Partners ﬁnd a common interest in resolving tragedies of the meadow. Solutions do
not require changing the payoffs of cooperation and defection. Dagen-H offers an
example of a design that supports cooperative interaction by rendering the
coordination equilibrium predictable in a potentially lethal game. Though it often
takes an accident to notice, the driving game is a horriﬁcally dangerous activity.
Driving involves moving heavy machinery at speeds an order of magnitude or more
faster than our terrestrial custom, in the fog, in the dark, around tight bends, on
water and ice, on streets strewn with hazards. Moreover the beneﬁts of driving are
not independent of the actions of others: by taking to the roads we place our lives in
the hands of strangers,
7 a signiﬁcant fraction of whom may be counted on to be
intoxicated, distracted, drowsy, or otherwise unﬁt and incompetent. Margins for
error reduce to centimetres. There is ample scope for randomness to unleash
nightmarish tricks. Person-to-person signalling is limited and evanescent. Erroneous
6 Discussed in (Bicchieri 2006). Corruption offers a familiar example of coordination’s failure: nearly
everyone loses from corruption, though once established, corruption remains difﬁcult to overcome.
7 At the time of H-Dagen, for example, Sweden’s population was just shy of eight million.
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thousands of lives are destroyed from driving. Yet the core problems of the driving
game are repeatedly solved.
8 The speciﬁc problem of the sideward travel dilemma is
universally solved. Moreover solutions are not unique to driving games, but rather
generalise across an intricate tangle of anonymous relationships and interactions,
defeating the entropic trend that formal models consistently predict. Why do we
choose cooperation in situations where beneﬁts rely on the responses of strangers?
9
Clearly assurance mechanisms evolve to enable coordination’s beneﬁts. Partners
risk losing these beneﬁts by going it alone, so ignore assurance mechanisms at their
peril. That assurance mechanisms are ratiﬁed from a convergence of cooperative
interests stands at the foundation of Hume’s explanation for governing authority. In
the passage immediately following his description of coordination’s failure in the
meadow, Hume writes:
Political society easily remedies… these inconveniences. Magistrates ﬁnd an
immediate interest in the interest of any considerable part of their subjects.
They need consult no body but themselves to form any scheme for the
promoting of that interest. And as the failure of any one piece in the execution
is connected, though not immediately, with the failure of the whole, they
8 Consider Samoa, which in 2009 became one the few countries after World War I to shift from the right
to left-sided driving convention. The proposal for this change was also met with hostile public criticism.
After the decision was announced, an organisation called PASS—People Against Switching Sides—
brought suit against their government. There were widespread public revolts, with several townships
promising public noncompliance. The proposed law change was described in the press as ‘‘a nightmare;’’
a prominent professor from Monash University testiﬁed in court that more accidents and road deaths
could be expected if the change were to proceed; see: http://news.theage.com.au/breaking-news-
world/samoans-revolt-against-road-side-switch-20090821-esz4.html. On September 6, 2009, amid fore-
casts of chaos, destruction, and death, Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi informed drivers by
radio that the leftward convention had become law. For a brief period government vehicles drove through
the empty streets using loud sirens to signal the transition. Despite forecasts for widespread social
calamity the transition occurred smoothly, in conditions that had appeared to many uncertain and dan-
gerous, yet without any major accident reported, see: http://www.howwedrive.com/category/
trafﬁchistory/.
9 Richerson and Gil-White comment:
Suppose you stroll to the corner restaurant for breakfast: eggs, bacon, and a glass of orange juice.
A simple activity? No. Mind-numbing complexity is more like it. A farmer in Virginia produced
your egg, another in Florida your orange juice, and yet another in the Midwest your bacon.
Different truckers brought each of these to a supermarket. The restaurateur then bought them there
and had them prepared for you. Seven people are involved in your ‘‘simple’’ activity? Well, no.
This is a caricature. Just for starters, the egg farmer/capitalist hires several workers to operate
considerable equipment, all of which was purchased from other companies, made up of capitalists
and workers, which in turn bought their parts from yet other companies, which… (the mind reels).
Your day has barely begun, and a few dollars worth of breakfast has already brought an army of
considerable size to your service (Gil-White and Richerson 2003).
Similarly, a comedy news agency ran a spoof headline: ‘‘Life Put In Hands Of 2,000 Complete
Strangers Every Single Day’’ (see: http://www.theonion.com/articles/report-life-put-in-hands-of-2000-
complete-stranger,20640/).
However, the joke almost certainly underestimates the magnitude of such mortal dependence. Betty
ﬂies at 40,000 feet above the surface of the earth in a Boeing 777–300, a machine composed of over
150,000 complex parts, each of which will have been designed, assembled, inspected, and refurbished by
teams of individuals who would not grieve her loss. Why ﬂy? Why leave home?
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remote. Thus bridges are built; harbours opened; ramparts raised; canals
formed; ﬂeets equipped; and armies disciplined every where, by the care of
government, which, though composed of men subject to all human inﬁrmities,
becomes, by one of the ﬁnest and most subtle inventions imaginable, a
composition, which is, in some measure, exempted from all these inﬁrmities
(Hume 1739: 3.2.7).
Hume is correct to notice that governing institutions, ‘‘the ﬁnest and most subtle
inventions imaginable,’’ evolve to coordinate the material interactions of agents at
cooperative equilibriums in the various games of life. Hume also understood,
correctly, that governing authority need not depend on the existence, effectiveness,
or competence of magistrates: a constellation of unstated conventions also evolves
to coordinate partners at efﬁcient equilibriums in the games of life, ‘‘acquiring force
by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of
transgressing [them]’’(Hume 1739: 3.2.2). Hume’s appeal to formal and informal
conventions as solutions to cooperation’s problems ﬁnds many contemporary
followers. For example, David Lewis writes:
Our experience of a general conformity in the past leads us, by force of
precedent, to expect a like conformity in the future. And our expectation of
future conformity is a reason to go on conforming, since to conform if others
do is to achieve a coordination equilibrium… Once the process gets started,
we have a metastable self-perpetuating system of preferences, expectations,
and actions capable of persisting indeﬁnitely (Lewis 1969: location 410).
Yet what enables conventions to be metastable assurance mechanisms? This
question requires us to consider what is required of an assurance device. Lewis
suggests: ‘‘[c]oordination may be rationally achieved with the aid of a system of
concordant mutual expectations, of ﬁrst or higher orders, about the agents actions,
preferences, and rationality’’ (Lewis 1969: location 302). Yet how can Betty know
what others expect of each other, as they reﬂect on each other’s expectations ‘‘at
higher orders?’’ Such concordant expectations would appear to invite an intermi-
nable regress of second-guessing among anonymous partners who inhabit large and
anonymous groups.
Notably, such a regress may be avoided wherever partners discover ‘‘focal
points,’’ Schelling’s term for features of a situation that dictate ‘‘each person’s
expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do’’ (Schelling
1960: 57). Focal points offer something like a publically consultable record that
instructs partners about what each should do, much like a telephone book tells Betty,
Svensson, and other strangers their telephone numbers. While one can always
pretend to be a skeptic about what others know, cooperation’s problem is not that of
refuting skepticism but rather of obtaining sufﬁcient motivation for sufﬁciently
many partners to afford cooperation’s rewards in Rousseau’s forest and Hume’s
meadow. The analysis of conventions as sufﬁciently clear public instructions,
sustained from mutually satisfying beneﬁts, appears plausible and has many
supporters (Bacharach 2006; Sugden 2003)].
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Elinor Ostrom expresses her dissatisfaction with the instructionalist paradigm in the
following way:
Simply explaining puzzling ﬁndings post hoc, as ‘‘they must somehow share
some norms,’’ is not a satisfactory strategy in the long run [and does not]
explain fully how individuals do overcome social dilemmas… [We] need to
dig into the analysis of institutions so that we can understand how individuals
adopt norms as well as rules to overcome social dilemmas (Ostrom 2005:
location 2676).
Why do cooperative instructions cause cooperation? Recall that we are interested
in solutions to cooperation problems at coordination’s fragile limits, where the
differences between cooperation’s dependent beneﬁts and defection’s independent
beneﬁts may be small; where the opportunity costs from cooperative decisions may
be great; or where successful exchange requires the cooperative actions of
potentially many anonymous partners. While solutions to such problems might
appear trivial, the instability of efﬁcient exchange at the risky end of coordination’s
spectrum arises from the simplest cases.
To see this, consider how coordination may fail partners who are able to
communicate before they interact. At ﬁrst blush, language would appear to be an
especially powerful assurance mechanism because it allows partners to name the
efﬁcient equilibrium as their focal point: ‘‘Tomorrow at 7 am, we drain the meadow.
Those who do not turn up will be beaten severely.’’ Indeed, the results of
experimental games show that coordination dilemmas are reliably assured from pre-
game communication even without such draconian threats. While subjects who
cannot communicate always learn the risk dominate equilibrium, those who can
communicate always learn the Pareto efﬁcient equilibrium (Kim and Sobel 1995),
even in situations where cooperation may be threatened by theft (Silk et al. 2000).
Does pre-game communication assure efﬁcient exchange because language
affords exquisitely precise and clear instructions? It is difﬁcult to know whether
experimental subjects who exchange comments before laboratory games have not
already cultivated cooperative habits from systems whose complexity far exceeds
the instructional capacity of language. We should not conclude from such
experiments that it is the propositional content of pre-game locutions that is doing
the motivational work. Similarly we should not infer from such experiments that
instructions assure real world coordination dilemmas. Indeed, we have independent
reason to doubt the plausibility of such an inference.
Problems for the reliability of language may arise even when interactions are
restricted to two communicating partners. We imagine that Betty and Svensson are
in a one-off stag hunt. However in this version of the game we replace the equality
of unilateral and mutual defection with an inequality (Hy for you when you defect
and they cooperate [ LO for you when you defect and they defect). Mutual
cooperation still pays both partners best, however we now assume that a defecting
partner does nearly as well when defecting at another’s cooperation as when mutual
cooperation succeeds (Fig. 2) [see: Binmore 2007. Note: we still assume that the
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evolve to seek relative advantages from spite].
In this modiﬁed Stag Hunt, Betty and Svensson will both desire mutual
cooperation, however the information conveyed by any proposition attempting to
coax the other into cooperating would appear to be insufﬁcient, on its own, to assure
their cooperation’s future. This is because both partners will wish the other to
cooperate, and (by assumption) to believe that cooperation will occur, even if each
feels too risk-averse to choose cooperation.
This problem for language generalises to ordinary stag hunts (i.e. those
resembling Fig. 1). Rubinstein considers the case in which small probabilities for
error are permitted in the delivery or interpretation of a message instructing an
efﬁcient but risky equilibrium (Rubinstein 1989). If Betty may doubt whether
Svensson has received her message or correctly interpreted it, she may doubt
Svensson’s cooperative response. Knowing that Betty may doubt his cooperative
response, Svensson may doubt whether Betty will act on her instructions, and so on.
Rubinstein points out that the more messages that partners convey across a noisy
medium, the greater the probability of coordination’s failure as conﬁdence factors
taking values less than one multiply into each other with the production of each new
message (Rubinstein 1989; Binmore 2008: 20)]. Setting aside the two player case,
we can see how this problem that Rubinstein notices for the predictive value of
naked instructions magniﬁes among anonymous partners, who must factor the
probability that some anonymous creeping skeptic in the mission critical group for
cooperation’s advantage will lose conﬁdence and defect.
Might symbolic culture do better than language? In an important paper, Alvard
and Nolin notice that whale hunting in Lamalera Indonesia closely resembles a Stag
Hunt (Alvard and Nolin 2002). Whales are sought after meat packages, but their
capture is risky. Crews hunt whales by harpooning the animal causing it to swim
and dive to exhaustion. During the hunt, whaling vessels may be towed far out to
sea; crew are sometimes ejected; ships occasionally sink: ‘‘By almost any standard,
whale hunting is dangerous’’ (Alvard and Nolin 2002: 539). Such risks, however,
are mitigated by collective hunting in which many boats give support to the
harpooning vessel. Any decision to hunt a whale carries the lost opportunity of
ﬁshing, a safer bet. In Lamalera Indonesia, whales are stags and ﬁsh are hares.
Alvard and Nolin make sense of numerous cultural factors as subtle assurance
mechanisms for the whale hunt. For example, the authors point out that an intricate
thicket of norms govern the distribution of whale portions. From these norms,
motivations to help with the whale hunt ﬁnd support from the predictability of (a
sufﬁciently) satisfactory division of spoils (Alvard and Nolin 2002: 547). Moreover,
the norm for hunting is itself well-established, hence past hunts are taken to be
precedents for future hunts. Finally, and important to the discussion below, the
authors argue that rituals function as pre-game communication devices. Prior to the
whale-hunting season villagers gather for Tobo Nama Fata, a celebration that
involves the crews, craftsman, and heads of local clans. The ritual enables relevant
parties ‘‘to discuss any mishaps, accidents, slights, and problems from the previous
whaling season, clear the air of any ill will, and suggest solutions for the upcoming
year. In this regard, [the ritual] is a formal forum for the discussion and
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10 Do norms, precedents,
decrees, and rituals assure solutions to tragedies of the meadow as ‘‘pre-game
communication’’ devices? Perhaps, though not merely because they convey
knowledge or instructions. Notably, to speak of past norms, precedents, and rituals
does not explain the evolutionary stability of such devices; nor does it explain how
partners respond cooperatively to novel problems; nor does it explain how partners
recover conﬁdence from cooperation’s inevitable defeats, when a whale escapes,
after a ship sinks or a harpoon tragically misﬁres. We have noticed that for fragile
exchange, pre-game instructions would appear too ﬂimsy to reliably assure
coordination at its risky limit.
The shortcomings of the instructionalist paradigm comes into sharp relief when
we consider the core problems of the Stag Hunt as Rousseau imagined them in his
original parable:
Were it a matter of catching a deer, everyone was quite aware that he must
faithfully keep to his post in order to achieve this purpose, but if a hare
happened to pass within reach of one of them, no doubt he would have pursued
it without giving it a second though, and that, having obtained his prey, he
cared very little about causing his companions to miss theirs (Rousseau 1755:
location 1216).
Rousseau’s stag hunters know what is expected of them. Their problem is not one
of instructions or knowledge, but rather one that ﬁnds its roots in a distracting
temptation for a safe gain and that ﬂourishes in an absence of regret over following
it. If languages, conventions, pre-game communication, rituals and other assurance
devices evolve to assure efﬁcient but risky exchange it is not simply because such
factors convey knowledge or instructions: ‘‘Everyone was quite aware…’’ The
success of any reliable assurance mechanism should rather depend on the manner by
which it modulates social and affective cognition in the face of temptation and risk.
I next consider how religions are ﬁtted to provide an especially powerful form of
social-affective assurance.
Part 2. Charismatic niche construction for risky coordination problems
I call the psychological characteristics associated with commitments and practices
respecting gods, religious traits. I assume that various institutional, developmental,
and genetic factors interact to produce religious traits. The frequency and character
Fig. 2 The modiﬁed stag hunt:
payoffs: HI[Hy[LO[0   =
equilibrium;  1 [ 2
10 Similarly, Michael Suk Young Chwe conjectures that ‘‘public rituals be understood as social practices
that generate common knowledge’’ (Chwe 2001: location 77).
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causal story. I call the various causes of religious traits—genetic, epigenetic,
accidental… etc.—religions. This term digniﬁes ignorance with a label, for we
know relatively little about the complex factors that interact to express and sustain
religious traits. In the next section, I consider three basic design features that we
might expect from any reliable assurance mechanism for coordination in Rousseau’s
forest and Hume’s meadow. Later I will use these features to explain puzzling data
on religions.
Charismatic governance
I use the term ‘‘charisma’’ in Max Weber’s sense as a perceived quality of a person
or situation that tends to evoke strong obedience and loyalty (Weber 1958). The
charismatic model starts with the observation that wherever factors may be rigged to
express commanding motivations that also align behaviours to cooperative goals,
tragedies of the forest and meadow may be avoided. I assume that such designs do
not evolve merely to communicate instructions but more fundamentally to regiment
social emotions.
Hobbes famously described our natural state as ‘‘a war… of every man against
every man;’’ from which a Leviathan releases us as ‘‘a common power to keep [us]
all in awe’’ (Hobbes 1651: pt.1 ch.13). Hobbes’s concept of ‘‘awe’’ points in the
direction of a satisfactory assurance mechanism because it suggests an overwhelm-
ing emotion capable of distracting partners from hare chasing. However it would be
a mistake to restrict attention to purely awesome cognitive governance. A more
fundamental property of an effective assurance mechanism is that it reliably ofﬂoads
strategic decision-making from individuals to subjugating factors in their world.
Such factors would appear to be especially effective wherever they reliably evoke
obedience and loyalty, which is to say, when they are charismatic in Weber’s sense.
Ecological engineering
For cooperation to pay, assurance mechanisms must not only reliably govern
cooperative cognition, they must do so in synchrony for sufﬁciently many members
of the relevant exchange group for cooperation to pay. The demand for synchrony
imposes strict requirements on the spatial and temporal properties of stable
assurance mechanisms. Regarding the geo-temporal properties of such designs,
there appear to be broadly two classes of solution.
Focal designs
Focal mechanisms may evolve to affect those citizens of a cooperative tribe who
share contemporaneous access to the same governing factors:
Betty   AWE   ! Svensson
Given the beneﬁts of charismatic designs that are capable of simultaneously
reaching many partners, we might predict that such mechanisms have been
10 J. Bulbulia
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many human habitats. Focussing on religious cultures, central and prominent
places of worship such as The Temple of Karnak in Egypt, The Temple of Hera at
Olympia, The Aztec Templo Mayor at the centre of Tenochtitlan (in present day
Mexico City), The Hagia Sophia in Istanbul, the statue of Jesus high above
Buenos Aires, and other salient but apparently worse-than-useless structures offer
prime candidates (when considered in light of the institutional, educational, and
ritual ediﬁces of which they form a part) for social-affective governing channels.
The independent emergence of central temple structures at the geographical centre
of each of the original urban centres of the middle Holocene (Wheatley 1971) also
ﬁnds an explanation in an evolutionary model for large-scale cooperation in which
focal, charismatic factors evolve to affect obedience to efﬁcient exchange and
loyalty to strangers. Again, we would not expect that such designs would evolve
to instruct partners; rather we would expect charismatic designs to evolve to
pervasively and reliably apprise and subordinate social affective cognition at large
social scales. Below we shall consider preliminary evidence for such focal
designs.
Diffuse designs
Cooperative ecologies would be strongly constrained if they were to require that
all partners congregate at roughly the same location and time. However,
charismatic factors that are scattered throughout the geographical and temporal
contexts of transacting partners may afford sufﬁcient coverage to underwrite
efﬁcient exchange, many persons to many governing nodes. For this reason we
might also expect diffuse designs to evolve to address the limitations of focal
pathways.
½AWE1  ! Betty &½Svensson   AWE2 
The beneﬁts of diffusion may help to explain the emergence and conservation of
relatively private affective cultures and practices: home altars, private worship,
mass produced symbolic regalia and religious texts, and other such outputs which
notably lack any clear means-end advantage or utility. The advantage of diffuse
distributions is that they do not limit partners to one geo-temporal local, allowing
charismatic factors to synchronise the cooperative behaviours of anonymous
partners across large geographically regions.
Notably, the conservation of dispersed and private religious practices and
artefacts remains otherwise difﬁcult to explain. For example, cognitive theories of
both focal and diffuse religio-symbolic cultures have concentrated attention to
memory effects (Whitehouse 2004), but it is unclear why the systems that
generate such seemingly arbitrary memories would be conserved as grains in
selection’s balance tilt against them. The ultimate explanation for such galvanising
and controlling cultures is, by contrast, well-explained from a model in which
religious cultures evolve to avert tragedies of Rousseau’s forest and Hume’s
meadow.
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Reverse engineering the temporal properties of assurance mechanisms may help
researchers to investigate the temporal organisation of religious practices. The
charismatic model predicts that schedules of exposure to cooperative agonists will
favour a recurrence rate that is sufﬁcient to maintain cooperative behaviours above a
minimal threshold for each mission critical member of a cooperative group. Such
requirements may help to explain the maintenance of otherwise costly festivals,
pilgrimages, public orations, parades, sacriﬁces, executions, and similarly repeated
productions as factors that maintain cooperative motivations at sufﬁcient levels.
Beyond their descriptive qualities, however, we shall see that little is known about
the evolution of the temporal properties of religions, or whether they manifest
designs that answer functional demands.
Part 3. How the charismatic model explains puzzles in the data on religious
cooperation
Religious practices bring opportunity costs, risks, and material expenses, ostensibly
with few economic or otherwise practical beneﬁts (Atran and Norenzayan 2004;
Irons 2001; Sosis 2003; Sterelny 2007). It is for this reason that religions would
appear to be worse than useless, yet they pervade, and continue to pervade, all
known societies. Why are religious inefﬁciencies conserved in nature’s unforgiving
economy? Charismatic niche construction answers this cost puzzle by approaching
religions as evolved assurance mechanisms for risky coordination problems. The
model improves on existing theories by explaining otherwise puzzling facts about
religion.
11 Before considering such puzzles, consider why many naturalists ﬁnd
evolutionary theories of religion plausible.
Why cooperative theories of religion are plausible
Cooperation theories of religion are hardly new. The fourth century Greek thinker
Critias speculated:
[H]umans established laws for punishment, that justice might rule over the
tribe of mortals, and wanton injury be subdued … the laws held [mortals] back
from deeds of open violence, but still such deeds were done in secret, then, I
think, some shrewd man ﬁrst, a man in judgment wise, found for mortals the
fear of gods, thereby to frighten the wicked should they even act or speak or
scheme in secret… Even if you plan in silence some evil deed it will not be
hidden from the gods: for discernment lies in them ...(Critias 2010).
11 I limit my focus to puzzles arising from cooperation theories of religion. Though I cannot consider
them here, I note that there are evolutionary approaches to religion that do not appeal to religion’s
cooperative or otherwise functional effects [for example, Boyer and Lienard (2006)].
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philosopher Mozi similarly conjectured:
[T]he awareness of ghosts and spirits is such that it is not possible to do
something in the darkest places, whether in wide marshes, in mountains and
forests, or in deep ravines without the awareness of ghosts and spirits certainly
knowing of it. The punishments of the ghosts and spirits are such that it is not
possible [to avoid them], whether rich and noble and [having a populace that
is] numerous and strong, or with brave and powerful forces, or with strong
shields and sharp weapons, for the punishments of ghosts and spirits will
undoubtedly overcome these things (Johnston 2010, § 31.17: 299).
While fuctional theories of religion are old news, renewed interest in religions as
evolved cooperation mechanisms has emerged from quantitative evidence demon-
strating religion’s prosocial effects. Many studies ﬁnd signiﬁcant correlations
between levels of religious commitments and levels of cooperative solidarity
(Atkinson and Bourrat 2010; Ginges et al. 2009; Johnson 2005). Those who believe
in moralising gods tend to endorse strong within-group moralities. Moreover, levels
of religious commitment appear to increase in response to coalitional threats (Bellah
1967; Chen 2010; Lanman 2009; Sosis and Bressler 2003). Thus, precisely at those
moments when we would expect to ﬁnd increasing efﬁciency and realism, religion
turns up its volume. Such remarkable effects are well explained by social-
functionalist models of religion.
The evidence for religion’s prosocial effects is not conﬁned to speciﬁc cultures or
time periods. Peter Turchin’s recent book War and Peace and War persuasively
argues that religious solidarity has repeatedly facilitated the mobilisation of partners
into highly cohesive units, contributing to the rise of empires across the globe for at
least the past two and a half millenniums (Turchin 2006). Turchin calls this quality
of religious solidary ‘‘asabiya,’’ a concept he borrows from the fourteenth century
political philosopher Ibn Khaldun: ‘‘Although Ibn Khaldun does not say it directly,
it seems that the religious feeling is a sort of asabiya, but one that can unite broader
groups than tribal-level asabiya’’ (Turchin 2006: location 1504).
12
Note that religious prosociality improves on cooperative mechanisms that
employ (purely) arbitrary symbolic devices to maintain group boundaries (for
example ‘‘green beards’’) from commitments regarding supernatural causation that
strongly motivate within-group prosociality. According to those who believe in
gods, it is ‘‘not possible to do something in the darkest places, whether in wide
marshes, in mountains and forests, or in deep ravines without the awareness of
ghosts and spirits certainly knowing of it’’ (Johnston 2010: § 31.17: 299)—an
alarming thought to any would-be defector. Similarly arresting: ‘‘[e]ven if you plan
in silence some evil deed it will not be hidden from the gods’’ (Critias 2010). While
the data on religious cooperation suggest that cooperative theories of religion are on
the right track, nevertheless certain puzzles arise when religion is modelled as an
12 For quantitative studies of the relative advantages of religious organisations to relevantly similar
secular counterparts see: Sosis and Bressler (2003).
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in Rousseau’s forest or Hume’s meadow.
Puzzle: why is religious cooperation stable?
Naturalists do not suppose that ghosts and gods actually reward and punish
cooperative behaviours. Why, then, do free-riders not invade pious groups,
destroying religion’s advantage? A plausible answer to the stability problem comes
from commitment signalling theory, which observes that wherever religious traits
are (1) reliably associated with cooperative traits, (2) hard-to-fake, and (3)
projectable, such traits may function as both motivators and signals of cooperative
futures. The idea is that (1) religious piety causes within-group cooperation and (2)
hard-to-fake expressions of piety assure this cooperation against impious defectors
who cannot manage to produce pious expressions convincingly.
While I think signalling theory remains important to the project of explaining
religion’s evolution, it has its limits: it does not readily explain religious cooperation
in anonymous worlds where partners cannot rely on interpersonal signalling. The
charismatic model, on the other hand, faces no problem from the stability of
anonymous cooperation because it suggests that religions evolve, at least in part, to
solve risky coordination problems. The model advises that researchers take a break
from asking how religion polices Prisoner’s Dilemmas and instead consider how
religion averts tragedies of the meadow.
Puzzle: why are religious ecologies sufﬁcient to enhance cooperation
without belief?
The experimental literatures have demonstrated subtle cooperative inﬂuences from
religious cues among participants who do not profess any religious beliefs. For
example Mazar and colleagues found that both religious and non-religious
(Canadian) students were equally likely to become more resistant to cheating
temptations after attempting to recollect the Ten Commandments, irrespective of
how many commandments they managed to recall or whether they believed in God
(Mazar et al. 2008). This result is consistent with a larger body of research showing
strong cooperative modulation in response to cues that suggest religious rules and/or
ghostly observers—here too without any clear dependency on supernatural beliefs
(reviewed in: Bulbulia 2009). Such effects are best explained as arising from low-
level sensory-motor processes, relatively automatically, from an implicit association
of supernatural cues withpro-social norms (Randolph-Seng and Nielsen 2008). Yet if
cues are sufﬁcient to cause cooperation, what advantages do costly religious beliefs
bring to cooperative interactions? A cost problem for religious belief remains.
Here too the charismatic model translates a puzzle into evidence. The model
predictstheexpressionofcooperationrelativelyautomaticallyinresponsetoreligious
cues. While the speciﬁc relationship of religious belief to cooperative outcomes
cannot be determined from a few experiments, the charismatic model clariﬁes why
governing obedience and loyalty of the kind sufﬁcient to stabilise risky exchange
should not stand or fall with anything so fragile as an explicit belief in supernatural
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cognitive processes to amplify prosocial commitments. Knowing nothing else, we
would predict a pervasive involvement of social-affective cognition in response to
factors that evolved for cooperative governance, aspects of which may evolve to
weakly control even those who disbelieve.
Puzzle: why are religious beliefs insufﬁcient to support cooperation?
Darely and Batson’s Good Samaritan experiment offers the classic demonstration of
how seemingly small variables can overwhelm the prosocial inﬂuences of religious
commitments, even when religion is strongly cued (Darley and Batson 1973;
Norenzayan and Shariff 2008). In this study, the authors instructed participants at the
Princeton Theological Seminary to give a sermon on a Gospel story extolling the
virtues of helping needy strangers. The control group was instructed to give a job
talk. Along the way, participants encountered a person in need. The sermon rehearsal
had no effect on helping behaviour. Nor did levels of religious belief anticipate
helping behaviour. The only signiﬁcant predictor of helping behaviour was the
degree to which participants were in a hurry (63% helped in the low hurry condition,
45% in the moderate hurry condition; 10% in the high hurry condition). This
experiment is important because it shows that religious beliefs need not invariably
support cooperation, at least cooperation of the kind that religious doctrines enjoin.
Recent studies reveal similar context dependent variability. For example Malhotra
found that while Christians were more likely to offer money to a charity after
attending church service, such effects vanished the next day, and did not return until
the following holy day (Malhotra 2010). Would any cooperation have been observed
on Sundays among church going participants who were in a hurry?
While the effects of religious contexts and commitments remain poorly
understood, the data suggest that religious beliefs may be insufﬁcient to strengthen
cooperative tendencies among the pious. The broader point, then, is that religious
beliefs appear to be neither necessary nor sufﬁcient to assure efﬁcient exchange.
I think it would be an error, however, to infer that explicit religious commitments
do not matter to cooperative outcomes in tragedies of the meadow. The complexity
of how context affects social-interactive outcomes is indeed the central, frequently
overlooked message of Darley and Bateson’s original paper:
It is hard to think of a context in which norms concerning helping those in
distress are more salient than for a person thinking about the Good Samaritan,
… It is difﬁcult not to conclude from this that the frequently cited explanation
that ethics becomes a luxury as the speed of our daily lives increases is at least
an accurate description… But perhaps this is not entirely accurate …
According to the reﬂections of some of the subjects, it would be inaccurate
to say that they realized the victim’s possible distress, then chose to ignore it;
instead, because of the time pressures, they did not perceive the scene in the
alley as an occasion for an ethical decision. For other subjects it seems more
accurate to conclude that they decided not to stop. They appeared aroused and
anxious after the encounter in the alley. For these subjects, what were the
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hurrying? Because the experimenter, whom the subject was helping, was
depending on him to get to a particular place quickly. In other words, he was in
conﬂict between stopping to help the victim and continuing on his way to help
the experimenter. And this is often true of people in a hurry; they hurry because
somebody depends on their being somewhere. Conﬂict, rather than callousness,
can explain their failure to stop (Darley and Batson 1973: 107–108).
Darley and Batson notice cooperative effects may exhibit complex situational
dependencies, here related to allocations of responsibility and time. For some
participants, the situations perhaps caused a moral blindness, for others, a
heightened sense of duty to authority. Such outcomes were artefacts of the
experimental design. More generally, beyond their superﬁcial descriptive properties,
we know relatively little about how natural and social human ecologies regulate
commerce—how they modify attention, a sense of urgency, loyalties, and generate
other cognitive effects relevant to efﬁcient exchange. Nor do we fully understand
the degree to which the effects of such mechanisms are mismatched to our current
circumstances. In the next section, however, I review preliminary evidence showing
how religious commitments interact with ritual contexts to affect perceptions of
solidarity, trust, and to underwrite revealed preferences for cooperation.
Part 4. Evidence for charismatic control
The charismatic model resolves certain puzzles in the data on religions, but how do
religious practices speciﬁcally affect the committed? I begin by examining recent
experimentsshowingsocial-regulatoryeffectsoflow-levelbodymovementsandpostures.
Evidence of automatic solidarity from focal ritual movements: laboratory studies
Recollecting his World War II military cadet training, the historian William McNeal
reports:
Words are inadequate to describe the emotion aroused by prolonged
movement in unison that drilling involved. A sense of pervasive well-being
is what we recall; more speciﬁcally, a strange sense of personal enlargement; a
sort of swelling out, becoming bigger than life, thanks to participation in
collective ritual… Obviously, something visceral was at work; something, we
later concluded, far older than language and critically important to human
history, because the emotion it arouses constitutes an indeﬁnitely expansible
basis for social cohesion among any and every group that keeps together in
time, moving big muscles together and chanting, singing or shooting
rhythmically (McNeill 1995; see also: Haidt et al. 2008; Wilson 2007).
Some initial quantitative support for the muscular bonding hypothesis comes
from Wiltermuth and Heath’s recent experiment investigating the effects of
synchronous movements and song on cooperative interactions (Wiltermuth and
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engaged in activities that varied in levels of body synchrony. Manipulations
involved passing cups and singing the Canadian National Anthem, ‘‘O Canada.’’
(Participants were American university students). Participants in groups who moved
and/or sang in synchrony were observed to be more cooperative in subsequent
iterated public goods games than were asynchronous and passive control groups.
Moreover participants in synchronous conditions reported enhanced feelings of
being on the same team and reported greater perceptions of similarity to their
counterparts. Such participants also tended to trust each other more. Importantly,
feelings of being on the same team partially mediated the effect of synchrony on
cooperation, suggesting that cooperation may be evoked, at least in part, by a
perceived sense of solidarity amongst synchronous performers, an effect consistent
with the sort of automatic prosocial affect that beneﬁts cooperation in Rousseau’s
forest and Hume’s meadow.
13
Laboratory data therefore offer some quantitative support for effects in the
neighbourhood of ‘‘muscular bonding.’’ Such evidence is interesting because it
demonstrates the production of cooperative behaviours from factors that do not
depend on any partner speciﬁc signalling of pre-existing virtues.
Evidence of automatic solidarity from an interaction of focal ritual movements
and sacred values: ﬁeld studies
A lingering question in the experimental data on muscular bonding is the degree to
which explicit commitments—values and beliefs—affect partnerships in naturally
occurring cooperative arenas. To better understand the effects of collective rituals in
vivo, Fischer and colleagues investigated interactions between sacred values and
levels of synchrony among nine religious and secular groups whose ritual
participants varied in their levels of behavioural synchrony and declared sacred
values. The team hypothesised that rituals with higher levels of body synchrony and
higher levels of reported sacred values would be associated with the greatest
amounts of solidarity, as measured by a standard economic game and a battery of
explicit scales.
14 The team found a signiﬁcant effect of synchrony on trust, with the
lowest trust found in non-synchrony groups, intermediate trust in factional
synchrony groups and highest levels of trust in groups with full synchrony.
Consistent with laboratory research (reviewed in subsection ‘‘Evidence of automatic
solidarity from focal ritual movements: laboratory studies’’), these results show a
signiﬁcant correlation between trust and naturally occurring synchronous rituals.
We also tested a process mechanism by which synchrony leads to pro-social
13 For similar results see: Hove and Risen (2009 and Valdesolo and DeSteno (2011).
14 A total of 113 participants from nine different community groups participated. Coding was based on
observations during the group activity. Synchrony was coded into ‘‘group synchrony’’ (whole group
performing the same movements or vocalizations in time with each other for[30 min; yoga; capoeira
[Brazilian martial arts]; Buddhist chanting; Kirtan [Hindu devotional singing]); ‘‘factional synchrony’’
(subgroups performing exact movements or vocalizations that are unique, but complementary to whole
group for [30 min; Brazilian drumming group; choir; Christian church service); and ‘‘no synchrony’’
(cross-country running group; social poker).
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effect on trust, entitativity and sacred values. We thus found, interstingly, that only
sacred values had a direct link to pro-social responses in the economic game.
These results are interesting because they show that synchronous body
movements affect cooperation in naturally occurring rituals, and that sacred values
may combine with synchrony to modulate particularly powerful pro-social
behaviours. More generally, the results point to the importance of interactions
between explicit judgments and low-level sensory and motor processing to
cooperative decisions.
Evidence for a limited spread of solidarity from focal ritual movements:
a Spanish ﬁrewalking ritual
A study of the heart rhythms of participants in a Spanish ﬁre walking ritual sheds
intriguing light on how rituals may strongly align certain core metabolic processes
associated with social affect among both ritual participants and spectators (Konva-
linka et al. 2011). Konvalinka, Xygalatas and their colleagues used recurrence
quantiﬁcation analysis (RQA) and cross-recurrence quantiﬁcation analysis (CRQA) to
quantify levels of shared arousal among participants and spectators to focal events of
the ritual. Their results show remarkably high levels of heart rhythm sharing, which
varied among speciﬁc groups of participants. The highest level of sharing was found
among fellow ﬁrewalkers as they responded to the ordeals of other ﬁrewalkers. This
suggests the involvement of empathetic mechanisms, the natures of which remain
obscure. A signiﬁcant but lesser degree of synchronicity was also observed in the
heart rhythms of spectators who did not walk as they viewed the ordeals of
ﬁrewalkers. This result suggests that ritually induced empathy may occur purely from
simulation, in the absence of any shared experience of the ordeal. Here too, however,
the underlying empathetic mechanisms remain unclear. Finally, onlookers with no
previous association to any ﬁrewalker did not manifest any detectable level of shared
arousal, suggesting that the social-cognitive effects of the ﬁrewalk ritual are not
automatic but rather depend on prior exposure or familiarity with ritual participants.
The key ﬁnding for our purposes is that spectators who were related to at least one
ﬁrewalker responded by sharing arousal to all ﬁrewalkers, including those ﬁrewalkers
with whom they had no signiﬁcant prior relationship. This surprising result reveals a
potential pathway by which solidarity may extend from groups of known participants
to groups of unknown participants. Some personal involvement with the trial by ﬁre
was necessary to evoke empathetic arousal, which when activated, radiated to
networks of unfamiliar cohort. This experiment hints at impressive subtlety in the
effects of a ritual on various types of participant, underscoring the perils of
oversimplifying stories about how rituals orchestrate their social-cognitive effects.
Evidence of reward modulation from diffuse rituals: neural effects of repetitive
prayer
In a recent fMRI study Schjoedt and colleagues compared the neural effects of
highly religious Christians who frequently practice repetitive prayer (‘‘The Lord’s
18 J. Bulbulia
123Prayer’’) with the effects of repeating familiar nursery rhymes (Schjoedt et al.
2008). The team found strong recruitment during the prayer condition in the dorsal
striatum of religious participants, with the strength of such effects increasing with
the frequency with which participants reported praying. Notably, the dorsal striatum
is a region that contributes to the processing of reward expectations, and is enlisted
during habit forming practices such as gambling and drug addiction.
For our purposes, Schjoedt and colleague’s data are interesting because they
show how religious emotions affect circuitry associated with reward expectations.
Do prayerful traits evolve to support stag hunting and meadow draining? While the
team did not record dependent variables related to solidarity and pro-sociality,
various strands of evidence points to cooperative effects of prayer (Sosis and Rufﬂe
2003), suggesting this possibility as yet another intriguing line of investigation. The
charismatic model is interesting because it suggests that practices of private
prayer—and the costly institutional matrices that surrounds them—may have played
a role, and perhaps continue to affect, the orchestration and stability of efﬁcient
exchange at large social scales.
Evidence of social affective modulation from diffuse rituals: neural effects
of intercessory prayer
Uffe Schjoedt’s team also investigated neural activations (fMRI) during ‘‘personal
prayer,’’ a regularly occurring practice in which Christians attempt to communicate
with a perceived supernatural agent through internal, improvisational dialogue.
Schjoedt and colleagues compared cortical activations during conditions in which
Danish Christians made wishes to Santa Claus with conditions during which they
prayed to God (Schjoedt et al. 2009). The authors found strong social mind
involvement of brain regions associated with Theory of Mind. Speciﬁcally the team
found enhanced activity in (1) the precuneus, an area that supports self-referential
awareness; (2) the anterior medial prefrontal cortex, a region associated with self-
awareness and mental perspective taking; (3) the temporopolar region, which
contributes to autobiographical memory; and (4) the temporal parietal junction, an
area associated with social prediction. No such activations were observed during the
wishing to Santa Claus conditions.
For our present purposes, this study is interesting because it shows that Christians
who pray strongly engage their social cognitive capacities. Consistent with the
team’s earlier repetitive prayer study, Schjoedt et al. found that the strength of
neural responses to prayer were predicted by the frequency with which participants
reported praying, suggesting a dependency of social-affective cognition on
repetitive regimes, and presumably other social and educational externalities
associated with religious enculturation.
15
15 Schjoedt and colleagues studied Christians who practiced prayer frequently. The Lord’s Prayer was
uttered an average of 4.75 times per week, with a variance of 1–14 times. Personal Prayer was reported an
average of 19.75 times per week, with a variance of 7–50 per week. All participants stated that they were
strongly conﬁdent of ‘‘God’s reciprocity.’’
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living reality, and God is believed to be capable of assuring future beneﬁts, then it is
at least plausible that believers will ﬁnd motivation from personal prayer to act
cooperatively in uncertain environments from an insensitivity to risks. Such a
manufacture of religious experiences from personal prayer may also beneﬁt
cooperation from the intrinsic rewards that religious persons associate with acting in
accordance with God’s desires (Batson et al. 1993). A third channel for cooperative
affect comes from the suppression of strategic Theory of Mind by strongly
focussing attention to God’s mind. While the cooperative effects of prayer need to
be more rigorously investigated before we can understand the downstream social-
cognitive consequences of prayer, this much is clear: tendencies to private religious
experience would appear to be a dangerous habit unless they offered some
compensatory support. On the other hand, wherever prayer is practiced widely,
religiously distracted partners may ﬂourish from the beneﬁts of efﬁcient exchange.
Evidence of hypnotic control: neural effects of religious authority
Another study from Schjoedt and his collaborators investigated the social-interactive
effects of prayer. The authors were speciﬁcally interested in how religious authority
affects religious experience, noting that many religious rituals are performed with
help from religious experts: shamans, priests, prophets, and gurus. The authors
conjectured that prior conﬁdence in religious authority facilitates religious experience
by positively adjusting expectations about ritual outcomes, which in turn supports
conﬁdence in religious authority (thus in part explaining the conservation both of
religious elites and of religious experiences; Schjoedt et al. 2010).
To better evaluate this hypothesis, the team subjected both religious and secular
participants to identical presentations of recorded healing prayers, but in conditions
that varied information about the alleged healer’s authority. In one condition,
participants where told that a healing prayer was issued from a Christian ‘‘renown
for his healing authority;’’ in a second condition, the speaker was described merely
as a Christian, and in a third condition, as non-Christian. The researchers then
compared differences in the neural signatures of participants as they listened to the
prayer recording.
The team found no signiﬁcant activations among non-believing participants
during any of the three conditions. However among Christian participants, a strong
down-regulation of executive cortex was observed in every condition with a linear
tread showing the strongest responses under assumptions of healing authority, the
next strongest responses from assumptions of shared religious membership, and the
weakest responses in conditions that suggested no shared religious afﬁliation with
the healer. Yet again neural signatures were most pronounced among Christians
who reported the highest levels of prior religious commitment.
16 Levels of frontal
network down-regulation were also correlated with positive evaluations of the
healer and with afﬁrmations of the experience of God’s presence while the prayers
16 Speciﬁcally, diminished activity was observed in the dorsolateral and medial prefrontal cortex, areas
associated with planning and strategic perspective taking.
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religious authority matters to the quality of religious cognition. Finally, Schjoedt
and colleagues noted interesting parallels between neural responses to healing
authority among Christian participants and neural responses to hypnotic induction
reported in the fMRI literatures (Oakley et al. 2007; Oakley and Halligan 2009).
The down-regulation of executive cortex during hypnosis has been observed to be
similarly sensitive to prior expectations about the hypnotist’s authority (MacLeod
and Sheehan 2003).
For our purposes, Schjoedt’s study is interesting because it reveals a hypnotic
down-regulation of executive processing in response to religious authority. The
absence of vigilance among those who attend to charismatic authority might appear
un-evolvable in worlds where leaders can exploit their followers. Yet such hypnotic
effects are consistent with the expectations of the charismatic model, which predicts
the evolution of designs that displace strategic control from individuals to
exogenous synchronising factors.
17 We would be gullible, however, to suppose
that religious elites never defect for gain. A more plausible hypothesis is that elite
power variously coordinates and exploits. An interesting implication of the Stag
Hunt is that the most selﬁsh of all partners will seek the beneﬁt of universal
cooperation most of all. Elite selﬁshness may sometimes be to the advantage of
efﬁcient exchange, if that selﬁshness is channelled to rallying the cooperation of
others. I will not pursue the analysis of this point further here.
Part 5. Conclusion
J. L. Austin once quipped about philosophical writing: ‘‘there’s the bit where you
say it, and the bit where you take it back’’ (Austin 1962: 2). Before reviewing the
bits I’ve said, let me take back some of the bits readers might have thought that I
said.
Five limitations of the model
Not all cooperation problems are Stag Hunts
While I have followed Schelling in thinking that a better model for cooperation’s
problems is one that focuses to ‘‘the situations in which everyone could be better
off, or some collective total could be made larger, by concerted or disciplined or
organised or regulated or centralized decisions’’(Schelling 1978: location 3110), I
have not claimed, and do not believe, that all such cooperation problems are best
modelled as Stag Hunts, tragedies of the meadow, or similar risky coordination
dilemmas. Often it is unclear whether collective action problems can be described
by simple game structures. An intriguing question is how we could know for certain
17 Lee Cronk argues for an evolutionary model of religion in which religious elites hijack manipulative
signals of virtue to exploit believers for personal gain (Cronk 1994). However Cronk’s explanation does
not clearly explain the persistence gullibility of followers.
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Yet as readers of this journal are well aware, the utility of simplifying models is paid
for by their power to explain more complex facts (Maynard Smith 1982: 9).
If it turns out that key features of many large scale cooperation problems are
usefully approximated as risky coordination problems, then somewhat speciﬁc
properties should be expected for mechanisms that evolve to assure them. I have
used such expectations to explain otherwise mysterious properties of religious
cultures and cognition, and to suggest fruitful avenues for research.
Religion may evolve to police prisoner’s dilemmas
Religion may help to resolve Prisoner’s Dilemmas in situations where interpersonal
signalling is available. Notably, certain hard-to-fake religious signals may be assessed
in a glance, enabling cooperative assortment in Prisoner’s Dilemmas at bounded, but
nevertheless large and impersonal social scales (Sosis 2005). Commitment signalling
theory remains important to the evolutionary explanation of religion.
Religion need not be ‘‘good’’
It probably goes without saying that religions may be adaptations without being
currently adaptive (Sosis 2009). Moreover to evolve, religion need not be ‘‘good’’ in
some moral or similarly qualiﬁed sense. Though attempting blanket judgements for
anything so large and diverse as human religions seems to me an invitation to
overstatement, a different issue. Finally, if we measure success in offspring, the
most insular, undemocratic, and technologically backward religions are associated
with extremely high birth-rates (Rowthorn 2011). Secular democracy appears to be
the genetic poison (Newson 2009; Newson 2009). Here we ﬁnd another case in
which genetic interests differ from moral interests.
Mechanisms other than religion assure risky coordination
The evolutionary literature has focussed on norms for punishing defection (Boyd
et al. 2005; Henrich 2006). Spatial properties and networks evolve cooperation.
Repeated encounter converts a Prisoner’s Dilemma into a game in which
cooperation is strongly favoured (Binmore 2005). Nested structures of rules appear
to stabilise cooperative institutions (Ostrom 2005: location 1359). Other cultural
evolutionary models show that prestige and success biases may combine with
imitative learning and virtue-signalling to favour religious cultural transmission
(Henrich 2009). I do not infer that one model is right to the exclusion of others but
rather that human-scale cooperation ﬁnds many tessellating supports.
Favourable illustrations have been cherry-picked
My argument for charismatic niche construction has assumed the form of an
abductive inference, or ‘‘inference to the best explanation’’ for known data (Harman
1965). However, making sense of the results of experiments should not be confused
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progress it is hardly sufﬁcient. I have argued for the beneﬁts of pursuing more ﬁnely
discriminating experiments.
Five beneﬁts of the model
It is important to understand that not all defection is cheating
‘‘Defection’’ can be, and often should be dissociated from ‘‘cheating.’’ Defection
motivated from risk may remain even after every motivation to cheat has been
removed. Moreover solutions to the problems of risk-avoidance may differ from
solutions that police cooperation’s theft. Evolutionary theories of religious
cooperation have almost exclusively focussed on the cheating problem, but this
has lead to anomalies. By thinking of religions as mechanisms that addresses other
types of cooperation problem, however, such puzzles become tractable, and new
pathways for empirical interest become evident.
Instructionalist solutions do not explain the stability of risky exchange
Pre-game communication, conventions, and other instructional devices cannot avert
tragedies in Rousseau’s forest and Hume’s meadow because risky coordination
problems are not problems of knowledge, common or otherwise. The beneﬁts of
cooperative actions in risky coordination games are conditional on the cooperative
replies of others. I have argued that such risky cooperation is made stable from
factors that evolve to cause cooperation at the level of interacting populations,
irrespective of what partners may doubt and know.
Puzzling data about religions are resolved as assurance mechanisms for risky
exchange
I have reviewed evidence suggesting that religion is associated with powerful group
solidarity, that religious institutions tend to outcompete secular rivals, and that
religions have long supported cooperation across linguistic, ethnic, and other
cultural divides, binding groups together with an especially powerful form of
solidarity. Such evidence supports longstanding conjectures that religions endure
from their prosocial effects (see section ‘‘How the charismatic model explain
puzzles in the data on religious cooperation’’).
However other evidence reveals that religious commitment is not necessary for
religious environments to enhance cooperative sentiments and behaviours, that
religious belief is not independently predictive of cooperative behaviour, and that
circumstantial variables easily swamp expressed religious intentions. What to make
of these contrasts?
While little is known about how religion speciﬁcally impacts on social-affective
cognition, a point that cannot be over-emphasised, nevertheless early results suggest
that religious environments are arrayed to strongly support cooperative outcomes.
The automaticity of religiously supported cooperation is consistent with the design
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emotionally committing partners to efﬁcient exchange, come what may. The
evidence suggests that religious beliefs are best approached as components of such
assurance mechanisms, elements of designs not wholes.
Preliminary studies suggest religion’s commanding prosocial effects
Laboratory experiments show that entrainment in body motions and vocal rhythms
tends to sustain cooperation over repeated interactions. Field studies reveal that a
combination of synchronous movements with sacred values evokes the highest
levels of cooperation in anonymous cooperative games. Participants and spectators
to an ordeal by ﬁre respond to the walks of others by sharing in their arousal,
however only if they have had some prior association to at least one ﬁrewalker.
Neuroscientiﬁc investigations show strong reward modulation in brain circuits as
highly religious Christians respond to repetitive prayers. Strong social mind
activations are found in response to intercessory prayers. Religious participants
respond to healing prayers by exhibiting hypnotic down-regulation of executive
neural circuitry, to different degrees depending on prior assumptions about the
authority of a healer. I have explained such effects as ‘‘charismatic’’ factors that
evolve to reliably and synchronously evoke, relatively automatically, widespread
obedience, loyalty, and similar prosocial sentiments. I have also warned, however,
that the diversity, magnitude, and duration of religion’s effects on social-affective
cognition remain poorly understood—that we know too little to draw deﬁnitive
conclusions about the functions of religious traits and the systems that cause them.
Evolutionary religious studies is relevant to the larger project of explaining human
cooperative niche construction
Dagen-H illustrates how solutions to risky coordination problems are possible
without any help from creeping shamans, sandal wearing prophets, or celabate nuns.
Even within the staunchly secular countercultures of late sixties Sweden, however, I
think we can discern elements of designs that synchronously affect cooperation
without explictly instructing cooperation: the underwear, the scantily clad women,
the iconic symbols, the contests and songs … Such designs do not appear to operate
by supplying knowledge but rather by hijacking strategic sensibilities. We have seen
that for risky cooperation, the mental gymnastics that accompany rational reﬂection
may be damaging to cooperative outcomes because such reﬂection augments social
predictive uncertainty. Needed instead to insure coordination are governing
inﬂuences that distract partners from risks and from second-guessing other minds,
while also motivating efﬁcient exchange.
As naturalists gradually come to grips with the enormity of the project of
explaining human cooperative niche construction (Sterelny 2010), we will do well, I
think, to better understand religion’s various designs and their positions among the
marvellous and strange fabrications that have evolved to regulate commerce among
strangers.
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